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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
LANE C. STROMBERG, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals Appellant petitions this Court to rehear or amend its 
decision handed down on November 8, 1989, 121 Utah Advanced 
Reporter 22. The following points of law and fact are asserted 
by petitioner as matters having been overlooked or misapprehended 
by the prior opinion of this Court. 
I. ERRORS AND OMISSIONS OF FACTS 
The Court in its opinion misconstrued and omitted several 
important facts which are relevant in analyzing the legal issues 
presented. These factual deficiencies are as follows. 
1. The Court failed to note that the April 1988 interview 
between Police Chief John W. Gardiner and the fifteen-year-old 
girl T.H. was in the context of a criminal investigation in which 
the defendant was being accused by T.H. of unlawful sexual 
intercourse. Moreover, this was the third interview conducted by 
Case No. 880618CA 
(Category No. 2) 
-1-
the Police Chief in the preceding months and was the first time 
in which any mention of drugs was made. (Tr. Motion to 
Suppress, p. 77). In addition, at the Motion to Suppress hearing 
Mr. Mark Andrus of the Davis County Attorney's office testified 
that if nothing else any drugs which were discovered during the 
search would be used as leverage in the unlawful sexual 
intercourse case. (Tr. Motion to Suppress, p. 184). 
2. The Court failed to note in its opinion that one of the 
interviews conducted by Chief Gardiner with the fifteen-year-old 
affiant occurred at the McKay-Dee Behavioral Institute where the 
girl was being treated for emotional problems. Chief Gardiner 
testified that he had talked with two psychiatrists at the 
hospital concerning her emotional stability. (Tr. Motion to 
Suppress, p. 54). 
3. The opinion also failed to note that charges were in 
fact filed against the defendant for unlawful sexual intercourse 
with the fifteen-year old minor and a trial was held on that 
accusation. Defendant was acquitted of the charge presumably 
because of the testimony of the fifteen-year-old accuser which 
the jury found to be unreliable. 
4. The Court stated in its opinion that Chief Gardiner 
"learned that the girl had no juvenile court record." In fact, 
however, Chief Gardiner testified that he only asked the girl as 
to her record and did not make any other inquiry from any source 
as to whether she had a record or not. (Tr. Motion to Suppress, 
pp. 56-57). 
5. The Court also failed to note the testimony explaining 
the reason for the delay between the April 25 statement upon 
which the affidavit was based and the May 20 request for a search 
warrant. Police Chief Gardiner was asked the following question: 
Q. But your concern was that you didnft believe 
the possession of marijuana was sufficient 
to get a search warrant in April to go out 
and search the home for that specific item. 
A. That's correct. (Tr. Motion to Suppress, p. 30). 
In fact, the house was placed under surveillance by the police 
department and it was not until alleged drug dealers were seen 
parked in front of the home that it was decided to conduct the 
search. The following dialogue indicates the true reason that 
the search was executed a month later: 
Q. But apparently Lon Brian indicated that this 
known user or dealer in drugs had been seen 
coming and going from Mr. Strombergfs home during 
his surveillance? 
A. Yes, he related that to us at that time. 
Q. Which would be the 19th or 20th? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that would be substantial that drugs had been 
brought into the home? 
A. The possibility of that, yes sir. 
Q. So obviously you met with Brian and director of 
the traffic force, Mr. Holthous, and said let's 
get the warrant today and investigate? 
A. We contacted the county attorney's office. 
Q. To get the warrant? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So the decision was made to search the home on 
May 20 to search the home? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q, Not specifically marijuana pipes, you weren't 
materially concerned about that, were you? 
A. Well I was concerned about that because that's 
what was in the house too. 
Q. Well any paraphernalia? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. But the main concern that you had was that this 
recent activity was thought to believe that drugs 
had been brought into the home? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And perhaps substantial drugs had been brought 
into the home? 
A. Perhaps. (Tr. Motion to Suppress, pp. 45-46). 
6. The opinion states "Defendant testified at trial and 
admitted possessing marijuana, but denied any knowledge of the 
cocaine found in his garage." This statement is also clearly in 
error. Mr. Stromberg*s girlfriend, Helen, testified that 
regarding a minute quantity of marijuana found in the bedroom 
that she had brought it into the home a considerable time prior 
to the search. Mr. Stromberg indicated that he remembered her 
bringing it into the home but had long forgotten about it and was 
unaware of its presence. The main quantity of marijuana found in 
the home was in the kitchen. In his testimony Mr. Stromberg 
denied that it was his, denied it belonged to him, and denied 
that he had ever seen it before. He simply testified that he 
owned the jars that held the marijuana. 
II. MISAPPREHENSION OF LAW CONCERNING PROBABLE CAUSE 
The omission of the critical facts concerning the manner in 
which the interview with the fifteen-year-old affiant was 
obtained casts a considerably different light upon her 
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reliability than that stated in the Court's opinion. The opinion 
states that the girl "in this case is more akin to the 'average 
neighbor witness' described in State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 
1366 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), than to a confidential informant," 
This statement is clearly incorrect when viewed in light of the 
corrected and omitted facts- The girl in this case had accused 
Defendant of a felony and was being interviewed by the detective 
based upon those accusations. An accuser of a crime is hardly a 
"average neighbor witness." 
In addition, the girl was being treated in a psychiatric 
hospital for emotional disturbances at the time these statements 
concerning the defendant's use of marijuana were obtained. No 
effort was made by the police chief to verify her reliability as 
to truth telling even though her presence in this hospital 
certainly would give rise to a reasonable suspicision that there 
may be problems with reality. 
These facts together with the admission by the county 
attorney that the effort to discover drugs in the home was for 
the purpose of inducing a plea to the sexual intercourse charge 
casts a reasonable doubt upon the objectivity of this witness and 
should require an evaluation of her veracity, reliability and 
basis of knowledge under the totality-of-the-circumstances test. 
State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987); Illinois 
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Thus, the statement by this 
Court that veracity is assumed in this case because of the girl's 
status as an "average neighbor witness" is incorrect and has made 
an improper analysis of what was required at the time the 
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affidavit was examined by the magistrate. Without such 
information being presented as to the reliability and veracity of 
the affiant "a court cannot determine whether the information was 
obtained in the context of unreliable circumstances such as 
casual rumor." State v. Droneburg, 120 Utah Adv. Rptr. 27, 
29 (UtahApp., Oct. 20, 1989). 
Defendant also sought to suppress the warrant on the basis 
that it was pretextual in that the police were seeking evidence 
of illegal activity other than the mere possession and use of 
marijuana. This Court focused solely upon the broad language 
contained in the warrant and rejected this argument of Defendant. 
121 Utah Adv. Rptr. at p. 24. 
The defendant, however, argued that this pretext search was 
also evidenced by the facts of the case as well as by the 
language of the warrant. As noted earlier, the police chief 
admitted that he did not feel he had sufficient reason to seek a 
search warrant merely based upon the girl's statements. Instead, 
he staked out the house and after learning that a purported drug 
dealer was seen at the residence decided at that point to seek a 
warrant. Again, from the transcript of the suppression hearing 
it is obvious that the police chief was seeking a much larger 
prize than consumptive marijuana. 
Thus, while the police chief essentially requested the 
warrant because of the observation of the alleged drug dealer's 
presence, he did not make this fact part of the affidavit to the 
magistrate. Presumably, because he knew that the mere presence 
of a reported drug dealer was not in and of itself sufficient to 
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what was actually found in this case based upon the girl's 
statements. 
For these reasons, therefore, Defendant respectfully 
requests that the issue concerning the legality of the search 
warrant be re-examined with a full hearing or, in the 
alternative, that the opinion be amended to include the erroneous 
and omitted material and that a new legal analysis be made. 
III. MISAPPREHENSION CONCERNING THE 
CLAIM OF PENALTY ENHANCEMENT 
This Court relies heavily upon the recent Supreme Court 
decision of State v. Moore, 120 Utah Adv. Rptr. 10 (Utah, Oct. 5, 
1989) . Defendant concurs that the decision in State v. Moore was 
correct based upon the circumstances. In that case the defendant 
was charged with selling narcotics to a confidential informant at 
his home which was located within 1,000 feet of a school in Moab, 
Utah. There seems to be no question but that a person selling 
and dealing drugs within the 1,000-foot area fits within the 
rational purpose of legislation to protect children from such 
influences. The Supreme Court stated, "In the instant case, 
under the police power, the state legislature has taken measures 
to protect the public health, safety, and welfare of children of 
Utah from the presumed extreme potential danger created when drug 
transactions occur on or near a school ground." Id. at 13. The 
court also stated, "The presumed potential risk that children 
could become customers or suppliers is a sufficient ground alone 
to rationally support the legislation." Id. 
The reasoning which is applicable to the Moore case is not 
applicable to the instant case. During the trial and at all 
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location of a residence to a school or playground. This is 
further evidenced by the fact as explained in the Moore case that 
the lack of knowledge about the proximity of a school is not a 
defense under the statute. 120 Utah Adv. Rptr. pp. 14-15. In 
Moore the Supreme Court justified the lack of this defense on 
the basis that: 
A reasonable person would know that drug 
trafficking is subject to stringent public regulation 
because it can seriously threaten the community's health 
and safety, particularly as it relates to the 
community's heightened concern for the health, safety 
and welfare of its children. And because knowledge of 
[the statute] is presumed in law, it is reasonable for 
Congress to have expected drug traffickers to ascertain 
their proximity to schools and remove their operation 
from these areas or assume the risk for their failure to 
do so. Id. at 14 quoting United States v. 
Holland, 810 F.2d 1215, 1223-24 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
This same presumption cannot be said to apply to individuals 
who use marijuana for personal use. There is no logical 
connection between their use in the privacy of their home and the 
location of their home to a school or playground. The majority 
of these types of individuals would not be aware of any thousand-
foot limitation from a school yard since such activity does not 
put them on notice of the same type of risk as a drug trafficker. 
Thus, while the enhancement statute can be justified in 
terms of commercial dealing of drugs for the protection of 
children it cannot be justified from mere possession in a private 
residence. For this reason a rehearing should be granted as to 
this issue also. 
CONCLUSION 
The failure to include essential facts, the misstatement of 
several facts, and the misanalysis of the probable cause issue 
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and the enhancement issue requires a re-examination of this case 
with the opportun -id-inf' In I nILy develop the arguments 
p res en ted herein. 
Respectfully submitted this jut; -* • 
'/ XKlfcC^ 
'Cook 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant 
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